Conflict is Party Politics

‘The clash of civilisations will dominate global politics’ — Samuel P. Huntington

Introduction

One of the arguments I find least convincing for a cause of conflict is that it is ‘innate’; in other words, specific groups of people have always hated each other and now fight as a result.

Anyone that has discussed the topic of conflict with me knows my dislike for Samuel P. Huntington’s article (and later book) The Clash of Civilisations. In a nutshell, he argues that in a post-Cold War global order, the primary cause of global conflict will be cultural. He thought (like many others at the time — read Francis Fukuyama’s essay The End of History) that the only alternative for countries to adopt, now that the world was no longer split between the US and the Soviet Union, was liberal democracy and a capitalist free market economy.

Surely the only reason why people would engage in conflict after this would be because of cultural differences, right?

The Culture Question

Many people disagree on what constitutes as ‘culture’. In fact, there’s not really an academic consensus on what culture is.

Every definition has its counterarguments. If one argues that it is made up of traditions passed down through generations, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger then argue that many traditions are invented (The Invention of Tradition — a pretty long read but I recommend the chapter on the invention of tartan in Scotland). They assert that this is because of the emergence of nationalism, particularly in independence movements and imperial rule. By designating the title of ‘tradition’ to a behaviour, ideal images of a far-away past are conjured up, thus stirring sentiment contrary to the status quo or consolidating it.

For the latter, the invention of traditional rituals was used by the British in colonial rule of India and sub-Saharan Africa primarily to legitimise British rule, among other reasons (such as deterring the questioning of belief systems and allowing for social cohesion).

Thus, the idea that culture is intrinsically linked to tradition is flawed if accepting Hobsbawn and Ranger’s arguments. For instance, they assert that ‘clan tartans’ do not have a history dating back centuries in Scotland. In fact, they are an 18th century invention based on increased tourism in the area (spurred by ‘tartanry’ — reduction of Scottish culture to ethnic stereotypes; think kilts, bagpipes, and haggis) and British rule attempting to quash uprising.

As interesting as the culture question is, I’m not trying to answer it in this article. However, it’s important to look at the debate to understand the flaws in the reasoning that conflict is driven by cultural differences.

The Oversimplification of the ‘Civilisations’ Argument

Simply chalking up conflict to cultural differences is reductive and, frankly, insulting. Huntington argues about how the ‘Islamic civilisation’ is the most prone to conflict since their ideologies don’t line up with those of the majority of the West. He then goes on to argue that the main attachment people have in the Islamic civilisation is to their religion, rather than their state, and their culture is incompatible with Western ideals of liberal democracy and representation.

With this, I encourage the reader to pause.

Were the ideals of democracy not incompatible with ‘Western civilisation’ at a point? The largest empire in the world was the British Empire, which relied on the exploitation and subjugation of millions for the benefit of the extractor.

Our entire global order, as it exists, is arguably a result of imperialism and expansion, for which the West bears the heaviest burden.

And yet, history shows that societies and their values are not fixed. We construct ideals, and we contest them. Societies transform drastically over time. To claim that certain cultures are incompatible with Western ideals ignores the fact that the hegemony of the West emerged as a result of a violent and undemocratic past. The ‘clash of civilisations’, therefore, discounts drivers for conflict being a result of rational actors making rational decisions. By assuming that other civilisations simply don’t understand Western political ideals is condescending, and it implies that they are both the victims of their circumstances and the perpetrators of their perceived backwardness. It denies every civilisation that isn’t the West political agency and reduces geopolitical motivations to a, frankly, essentialist view.

In short, the ‘clash of civilisations’ is a problematic view of how geopolitics function today.

Partisanship and Conflict

When I was 5, my parents took me to the UN Buffer Zone in Cyprus as part of a family holiday which coincided with academic work they were doing. Despite being one of the longest peacekeeping missions in the world (est. 1964), the area itself is quiet. Bullet holes dot the old, abandoned hotels, but there is also a golf course not too far from the Green Line itself. If anything, it’s dusty and rather barren. There is no active violence taking place.

The Green Line came about as a result of violence in late 1963 when the British were still extensively present on the island after Cyprus gained independence from the Empire in 1960. The violence was between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the island, the island’s two largest ethnic groups.

Said violence between these two communities wasn’t ‘cultural’ in nature, despite clear differences in cultural practices, language, and religion. It came about as a result of uneven governance and Greek Cypriots essentially holding a monopoly in the government, subjecting Turkish Cypriots to violence.

In 1974, Türkiye invaded Cyprus in Operation Attila in response to an attempted Greek Cypriot coup and occupied 37% of the island. Where they occupied is now the de facto state of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and the Green Line is the internationally unrecognised border.

In the UN, only the Republic of Cyprus is recognised. Internationally, there is no border and Northern Cyprus does not exist under international law. In practice, however, it has a functioning government, its own money (the Turkish lira), and own state provisions. By all accounts, Northern Cyprus is relatively safe and functions well.

This begs the question, therefore, of why is there still a peacekeeping mission on the island?

The point I’ve been leading up to in this essay is relatively straightforward: conflict is party politics. If politicians vie for power, the easiest way to build a platform is on a united one against a common enemy. It gives purpose to a candidate, and an easy way to mobilise enough people to get them voted in. Partisanship in modern politics allows for governments to either manufacture or sustain external threats as a way of consolidating authority. Rallying a population around a common enemy (either real, exaggerated, or fictional) can also divert national attention from internal issues. Both Cyprus and Northern Cyprus have engaged in this, with a distinct form of nationalism developing in both Cyprus and Northern Cyprus that spurs political behaviour. There is no real motivation for either side to end the conflict.

We can see party politics driving conflict in another key case. It’s beneficial to the government of Israel to wage war against the civilians in Palestine because Netanyahu’s government was formed in a weak far-right-wing coalition. He aims to keep power. Despite the Israeli retaliation of October 7 being a defensive manoeuvre, Israel has prolonged the conflict, prohibited aid from entering Gaza, and killed over 55,000 Palestinians. The Israel-Palestine conflict has little to do with cultural differences and more to do with internal (as well as external) power struggles. The events of October 7 were a catastrophic security failure by Israel, and the government’s use of disproportionate force after that is less about long-term security and more about preserving political power. By ascribing the conflict to ‘cultural differences’, we discount how geopolitically complex the history of the region is, and we completely ignore the fact that conflict doesn’t just happen — it’s a result of deliberate political decisions made by rational actors pursuing power, legitimacy, and control.

Netanyahu’s grip on power is weak, and if Israel is not at war, he can face public humiliation and be forced to resign. 70% of Israelis disapprove of him, and two ministers from the coalition have been put under sanctions by countries like the UK, Canada, and Australia.

In this context, the continued disproportionate use of violence and the war crimes committed against Palestinians by Israel serve two key purposes:

1. It maintains the idea of an existential threat to the state that can justify extreme policies;

2. It suppresses domestic opposition to Netanyahu’s government by framing dissent as disloyalty to the state in a time of national crisis.

This tactic is not unique to Israel. The de jure government of Cyprus as well as the de facto government of Northern Cyprus benefit off the continued perceived conflict. Although the two sides haven’t engaged in active conflict for decades, politicians adopt their stances based on the conflict, and their domestic policy stances influence efforts (or lack thereof) for reunification or perhaps a two-state solution.

Closing Remarks

This pattern isn’t unique. Across the world, governments and political leaders have historically used conflict — or the persistent threat of it — as a means of political survival. By sustaining external tensions or framing certain groups as existential threats, leaders can monopolise their control of their state. This seems to be a symptom of weak leadership, seen through the case of Netanyahu’s insecurity with the far-right-wing coalition that currently governs Israel. He is attempting to distract from domestic failings and propping up the illusion that the government isn’t breaking down.

I also know that conflicts are far more complex than I’ve described in this article. Each has its own nuances and individual historical and geopolitical factors. Unfortunately, I cannot possibly write enough in time to go over why I think every conflict has started in great detail.

Instead, what I’m trying to do is illustrate a general pattern, discernible as one of many causes for conflict in our current global political system. I welcome comments and discussion about other perspectives. Open dialogue is a foundation of academia, and the right to express one’s opinions freely is one we shouldn’t take for granted.